Here’s Andrew Korybko writing today on his substack. For once I have no quibbles, but would add this. Following NATO aided drone strikes on the Russian presidential palace of December 29, while Trump was on the phone talking peace with Putin – sound familiar? – the Russian leader, long preceded by his Security Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, has reduced to near zero the distance from his more hawkish domestic critics. 1 In this he’s moved from a minority to a majority within both the Kremlin and, it would seem, a Russian public impatient with their leader’s renowned caution as regards Ukraine.
(For more on the shift in Putin’s thinking, see the Jon Kurpis essay two days ago in the Duran. It also serves as a succinct corrective to the cartoonish depictions of Putin by which all segments of Western media instil within their audiences such loathing – weak opinions strongly held – of a man of whom they know virtually nothing.)
Over to Mr Korybko on why Russia needs to toughen up.
Russia Must Defeat Ukraine Before Trump 2.0’s “War Of Attrition” Really Gets Going
The only reprieve in that dark scenario, other than obliterating Ukraine to neutralize the NATO threats emanating from there once and for all per the special operation’s goal, would be for Russia to sell stakes in its natural resource and other critical industries to the US as a “security guarantee”.
It was warned last fall that “The US Plans To Wage An Intensified Proxy War Of Attrition Against Russia”, and now that Trump just signaled that he plans to “escalate to de-escalate” with Russia per the arms- and sanctions-related terms of the G7 joint statement that he signed, this might now begin to happen. As a reminder, the Wall Street Journal reported that this three-phase strategy involves helping Ukraine surpass Russia’s drone capabilities, more secondary sanctions, and provoking unrest inside of Russia.
Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes have targeted energy infrastructure in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and even Tyumen (the latter possibly by drones launched from Kazakhstan without [Kazakh capital] Astana’s knowledge). Ukraine then hit an electronics plant in Voronezh and a satellite communications center in Moscow Region on Monday. Two days prior on Saturday, the Head of Crimea suspended fuel sales for everyone but the government, which highlighted the consequences of Ukraine’s “drone blockade” of Crimea.
The war of attrition Ukraine is now waging against Russia through its strategic strikes on energy and other infrastructure is timed for September’s next Duma elections. United Russia might not maintain the 49.82% of the popular vote from the last elections in 2021, which could force them into a coalition with the communist or nationalist opposition depending on how high the protest vote is. Putin’s foreign foes believe that this would weaken Russia, instead of rejuvenate it, and want to help make this happen.
The aforesaid strikes are thus being paired with Zelensky’s ultimatum to Lukashenko to withdraw air defenses and drone relay stations from the border or Ukraine will do it for him. It was assessed here that Putin now has a chance to restore deterrence if Zelensky authorizes attacks against the 500 targets that one of his top drone commanders earlier claimed had been identified in Belarus. If deterrence is restored, then Russia might maintain the tempo to defeat Ukraine, thus swiftly ending the conflict.
If everything turns out differently, such as if deterrence isn’t restored by Russia after a large-scale Ukrainian attack against Belarus or no such attack occurs and the conflict drags on, then Trump’s “war of attrition” might really get going and begin systematically destroying all Russian targets one-by-one. Former top Russian spy Andrey Bezrukov recently admitted that “we were not prepared” for Starlink aiding strikes against critical infrastructure and advised maximally protecting all targets without delay.
That’s difficult to do with a country as large as Russia is, so if Trump “escalates to de-escalate” in a way that radically scales Ukraine’s strategic drone attacks, then Russia might be at a disadvantage where time would no longer be on its side like previously assumed by many in Moscow. Ukraine’s logistics are nowadays under NATO’s nuclear umbrella, so unless Russia risks World War III by striking them and gambling that no one (let alone the US) will retaliate, then it might face “death by a thousand cuts”.
The only reprieve, other than obliterating Ukraine to neutralize the NATO threats emanating from there once and for all per the special operation’s goal, would be for Russia to sell stakes in its natural resource and other critical industries to the US as a “security guarantee”. Knowing Trump, he’d likely demand that they be sold at pennies on the dollar and possibly include controlling shares, which would essentially cede Russia’s sovereignty. That’s why Russia must defeat Ukraine before his “war of attrition” really gets going.
* * *
- Critics of Putin’s “timidity” are not confined to Russia. See this piece by Reagan appointee to the US Treasury, Paul Craig Roberts. A gamekeeper turned poacher, as early as 2019 he was blaming Kremlin “appeasement” as a threat to world peace second only to US aggression. Three days ago he was at it again: “Why does Russia tolerate a president and a political party who intentionally deny Russia victory, instead spreading the hardship of war over the country and enabling a minor conflict to develop into a war with the West? … Pucilanimous Putin [sic] is leading the world into Armageddon.”
In my opinion, after reading him for the last 4 or 5 years on various sites, Korybko is a poor judge of anything to do with Russia, on a par with Paul Craig Roberts (who has only one tune), Gilbert Doctorow and John Helmer (all USAians). His thesis is comfortably refuted in some of the comments below the article.
In mine, Jams, few commentators are ‘reliable’ in the sense of needing no counterweight from other sources. Mr Korybko frequently irks me for reasons I’ve given elsewhere, but covers areas of geopolitical significance – not just Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia but Africa’s Sahel, the Horn, and Latin America – few others do. Duly triangulated these offer granular detail, in short but frequent posts, to flesh out the broader brush strokes of more important figures like Brian Berletic and Nel Bonilla.
I seldom consult Paul Craig Roberts or Jon Helmer but that has nothing to do with their being American. So are Michael Hudson, Richard Wolff and the aforesaid Brian – all of whom have advanced my understanding big time.
Rightly or wrongly the voices I’m now most wary of are not flawed Westphalians like Andrew Korybko and Glenn Diessen, but well meaning wishful thinkers like Scott Ritter and Pepe Escobar. Nor am I entirely won over, for all my respect for them, by Alastair Crooke, John Mearsheimer, Daniel Davis, Judge Napolitano and others who say the US is massively defeated. These last are indispensable voices, but we have to keep in mind limitations not confined to blindness to empire and class, and/or the erroneous belief that Israel dictates US policy, in their worldview. See my recent post, first in a series as yet unwritten, on whether said empire can monopolise global energy. Featuring Nel Bonilla, it cautions against the twin sins of assuming on the one hand an unstoppable hegemon, on the other of seizing on every setback as proof of its imminent collapse.
Hmm. Well, we’ll just have to differ on these matters. But more power to your elbow elsewhere.
(:-)