Why can’t the US make enough weapons?

9 Aug

August 9, 2026August 10, 2026 steel city scribe 0

When this Duran piece by Jon Kurpis reached my inbox this morning, I was motivated to do what I seldom do nowadays. I wrote a comment below the line on the Duran substack:

A worthy read, but missing from this otherwise sound analysis are that (a) the United States sits atop a rapacious empire dangerously flailing and dysfunctional in its decline, and (b) deficiencies in its industrial war machine go deeper and wider than its proposed reforms address. For some fifty years, since the Reagan era, it has suited a rentier American ruling class, which has captured both wings of a duopoly masquerading as a democracy, to offshore manufacturing to the global south while turning the domestic economy into a FIRE – finance, insurance, real estate – dominated haven for rent seeking corporate oligarchies. Now far behind China on the creation of real wealth, it would take decades to catch up on the transport infrastructure, modernised industrial plant and training investment without which the narrower program Jon Kurpis proposes can have at best limited efficacy. ¹

Neoliberal reification of Market Forces is riddled with contradiction. Offshoring wealth creation to where labour is cheap and pliant is profit driven, but at the same time weakens the ability of US oligarchies to extract value from the global south by diverse means, including armed force sold to credulous Western audiences as humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless the Duran piece is a worthy read which does shed light on glaring defects – till recently absent from corporate media coverage and comment but on display both in the proxy war against Russia in Ukraine and in Washington’s catastrophic underestimation of Iran – in empire’s capacity, ex nukes, to wage wars of attrition against a peer or powerfully asymmetric adversary.

Production Obstruction – Part II

The second part and final part of a series examining the history of the American industrial war machine and the structural factors driving the United States’ current military production crisis.

Jon Kurpis is an elected official, writer, and entrepreneur dedicated to advocating for everyday citizens. Known for his independent mindset and principled approach, Kurpis is respected for holding those in power accountable. His background in government, policy, and geopolitics makes him a trusted voice on complex political and cultural matters. He is a Contributing Analyst for The Duran Daily. More of his work can be found on his Substack, kurpis.substack.com.

In Part I of Production Obstruction, we chronicled America’s military production from the Civil War in the 1860s all the way through to the present day. This historical record allows us to recognize the points at which the United States made major leaps in defense production. We were also able to determine the upper limits of what is possible in terms of military output through our analysis of WWII, as well as what sustained, long-term investment was capable of achieving by the end of the Cold War. Lastly, we identified the post-Cold War strategic shift that has dramatically impeded American military production and contributed to the vulnerable position in which the United States finds itself today.

In Part II of Production Obstruction, we pick up by further examining the military production issues currently weakening the United States. Through this examination, we will identify the acute factors that have contributed to the current situation as well as determine what can and should realistically be done to address these problems.

To gain deeper insight into the general types of problems that are holding back the United States military production capacity, one need look no further than a recent Department of War Office of Inspector General report regarding the projectile metal parts facility in Mesquite, Texas. Opened in 2024 after receiving at least $469 million in defense funding, the factory was expected to deliver 30,000 critical metal projectile parts by 2026. Unbelievably, as of March 2026, the facility had failed to produce a single part.

The Department of War Office of Inspector General reported:

Without the 30,000 additional projectile metal parts anticipated from the Mesquite facility, the Army will be unable to reach its monthly capability goal of 100,000 155 mm artillery rounds …

As of March 2026, the Capability Program Executive Ammunition and Energetics officials have not developed a plan to produce the additional rounds that are supposed to be produced at the Mesquite facility.”

This example encapsulates the military production problems confronting the United States.

The Pentagon allocated nearly $500 million to construct a facility with the expectation that it would deliver 30,000 critical projectile parts by 2026. But when the time came to produce those parts, the factory delivered nothing. Adding insult to injury, the Inspector General also found that there isn’t even a plan for replacing the lost production. And as a result, critical munitions production is delayed and the Army was left without a credible backup strategy.

As an American citizen and taxpayer, I expect my country to be well prepared militarily, especially given the astronomical sums allocated to national defense every year. That does not, however, mean that I agree with America’s neoliberal foreign policy or view it as anything other than reckless and self-destructive. What I am asserting in this piece is pragmatic. If the United States is required to fight a high intensity conflict over an extended period of time, it should, in theory, have every weapon, aircraft, munition, supply, technology, and other resource necessary to defend itself for as long as required. Given America’s size, natural resources, population, and war chest, that expectation is more than reasonable. That said, it is obvious that the United States does not currently meet these standards. Despite annual defense expenditures approaching one trillion dollars, significant production bottlenecks and supply chain weaknesses remain the norm …

Continue reading on the Duran substack …

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The following day, August 10, Jon Kurpis replied graciously thus to my comment:

Philip, thank you very much for reading my article. You bring up a lot of very good points, and I don’t disagree with the issues you’re raising.

When I was thinking about how to approach this discussion about the military production problems we’re facing, I knew there were much deeper issues underneath all of this. I touched on some of them towards the end of the article as there are significant structural problems that have led us to the pretty insane situation we find ourselves in today.

But those are enormous issues, and they go well beyond the military production. They really get into fundamental problems with the way the American economy and industrial base have developed over the past several decades. I could have gone much further into all of that, but then it would have become a very different article.

What I was trying to do instead was offer some practical policies that could at least get the ball rolling. They aren’t perfect solutions, and by themselves they certainly aren’t going to fix everything. But I think there’s value in giving people something concrete that they can look at and say, “We could actually do this.”

I’ve always believed in the mantra that a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. If people can see honest, practical measures that would have some effect, even a limited one, they’re more likely to get behind them and demand that something actually be done. And once you start moving in that direction, you create the possibility of building enough momentum to eventually tackle the much larger structural problems you’re talking about.

So I just wanted to explain why I wrote the article the way I did. I wasn’t trying to suggest that these policies address the deeper problems you’ve raised nor fix the military production issues in totality. My aim was to identify a realistic place to start, because we have to start somewhere.

To which I in turn replied:

Thanks Jon. In the main I see my comment as extension of, rather than disagreement with, your points. You say early on that:

“As an American citizen and taxpayer, I expect my country to be well prepared militarily, especially given the astronomical sums allocated to national defense every year. That does not, however, mean that I agree with America’s neoliberal foreign policy or view it as anything other than reckless and self-destructive. What I am asserting in this piece is pragmatic. If the United States is required to fight a high intensity conflict over an extended period of time, it should, in theory, have every weapon, aircraft, munition, supply, technology, and other resource necessary to defend itself for as long as required. Given America’s size, natural resources, population, and war chest, that expectation is more than reasonable.”

As “crown subject” of a junior imperialism and former colonial power, the UK, whose governments have for decades prioritised Washington’s interests over those of the people they govern, I too take a pragmatic view. While I welcome defects in the imperial war machine, be they in my country or yours, I also welcome your intelligent appraisal.

Production Obstruction – Part II

The second part and final part of a series examining the history of the American industrial war machine and the structural factors driving the United States’ current military production crisis.

Without the 30,000 additional projectile metal parts anticipated from the Mesquite facility, the Army will be unable to reach its monthly capability goal of 100,000 155 mm artillery rounds …

As of March 2026, the Capability Program Executive Ammunition and Energetics officials have not developed a plan to produce the additional rounds that are supposed to be produced at the Mesquite facility.”

Philip, thank you very much for reading my article. You bring up a lot of very good points, and I don’t disagree with the issues you’re raising.

So I just wanted to explain why I wrote the article the way I did. I wasn’t trying to suggest that these policies address the deeper problems you’ve raised nor fix the military production issues in totality. My aim was to identify a realistic place to start, because we have to start somewhere.

Thanks Jon. In the main I see my comment as extension of, rather than disagreement with, your points. You say early on that:

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