Europe: an increasing irrelevance?

19 Nov

Today in the south China city of Shenzhen the summit some are calling the new Yalta – after the January 1945 summit which set the new post-war global order – took place between the leaders of the People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation and United States of America.

Writing on the Strategic Culture Foundation website under the header, The Shenzhen New Yalta Summit that will define the new world order, Lorenzo Pacino begins …

Formally, the agenda is limited: nuclear arms reduction and the conflict with Iran, with the possible addition of North Korean. Washington is tempering expectations: a senior administration official said he does not expect any agreement and spoke of the start of a conversation. But it would be a mistake to gauge the importance of Shenzhen by the documents it will produce. The political significance lies in the format itself. For the first time in eighty years, the powers that matter are recognizing each other as equals and sitting down together to discuss the world. The comparison many have drawn—and which should be taken seriously—is with Yalta.

… and ends with heroic optimism on a ship many of us say has already sailed:

For Europe, it is a warning: those who do not sit at the table end up on the menu. It will be up to European capitals to decide whether to continue lamenting their exclusion or to finally build a foreign policy capable of earning an invitation. 1

The piece is worth reading in full. Trouble is, I found it on the Strategic Culture Foundation site, a useful resource now blocked in Europe on the ground it transmits Russian “disinformation” – which in the freedom loving West means ‘information contrary to our own chosen narratives’.

The creeping degradation of even the pretence of democracy in Europe was touched on by Michael Hudson in a dialogue with Glenn Diesen 2 posted two days ago. At 02:50 Michael opines:

The voters in Europe don’t seem able to get rid of Merz and Macron and change the British Labour Party, so they really don’t have a voice. What kind of democracy in that? No matter what they vote for, they’re subject to the world as it is and it’s largely under the US policy to fight Russia, to fight Iran, and to do to them what it did to Venezuela. To take over their oil, and all of this is a fight for oil. We want to control the choke point of oil, and who’s going to get the profits from all of the world oil trade?
… We’re going to war with them. And that’s causing the whole backwash of problems. There’s rising pressure in Europe from the populist group, the nationalists who want domestic sovereignty. They want their countries to be able to say, we’re going to run our foreign policy and domestic policy in the interest of preserving prosperity and helping us not simply to be satellites of the US fighting in against Russia, Iran and all of its war on the rest of the world for its own self-interest … the fight in Poland was over the constitutional crisis: could Poland have its own rules independently of the EU, von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas, etc?
They’re basically arms of NATO, of US policy and Pentagon. So all of this democracy, it comes down to national sovereignty. Is Europe to be run for the benefit of its citizens, who need cheaper energy or enormous government subsidy, that EU rules of national budgets won’t permit, especially with government budgets all moving away from social support to military spending, which few European voters favor? Europe seems to have lost its democracy.[/note])

Back to Mr Pacino. Since reading his piece two days ago I can no longer access it even via the Tor Browser or Yandex. For those more patient and/or knowledgeable than me, the link is:

https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/11/18/shenzhen-new-yalta-summit-that-will-redefine-future-world-order/

Luciano Pacino isn’t alone in making the Yalta analogy – again not in expectation of ground-breaking outcomes but for the significance of its optics and message to the world. A twenty-three minute podcast today at the Duran, though misleadingly captioned, makes the same point before re-converging on a second; viz, that Europe is well and truly out in the cold.

Which brings me to today’s offering, another piece I read two days ago at Strategic Culture but can no longer access. In this case, thankfully, a Brave New Europe site so far unblocked also ran it. So without further ado, I’ll hand over to its author, the unfailingly erudite and calmly reasoned former British diplomat, Alastair Crooke.

The ground on which Europe stands is shaking

European Commission proposing 81% increase in annual contributions to EU budget by member states for next year
Alastair Crooke is a former British diplomat, founder and director of the Beirut-based Conflicts Forum

Configuring the European-wide hostility towards Russia has been the long-standing project for Europe since at least the 1990s. The U.S. security cadre long embraced the eastward expansion of Europe as a key post-war objective — firstly to combat communism in post-war Europe; and secondly, the expansion of NATO and then the EU served to lock EU states into a U.S.-led security architecture. This structural engineering caused the EU’s foreign and security structures to become dysfunctional, caught as they were in the ‘headlights’ between the ‘New European’ takeover of “Old Europe” (as U.S. Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld taunted in 2003 at NATO headquarters in Brussels), effectively undercutting any attempt to have an autonomous EU foreign policy.

Enlargement to the east effectively also hollowed out the EU’s political project — the idea had been that the EU could become a ‘global geopolitical actor’ as a counterweight to American unipolarity. The EU therefore was transformed into little more than a large regulatory trade zone with little policy cohesion and no clear supra-arching vision of what it meant to be European.

With the American-inspired flooding of the Union with new accession states, whose security and foreign policy loyalties lay more with Washington than with the interests of citizens of core European states, this loss of clear purpose ham-strung the evolution of any coherent European ‘project’.

So, in the absence of any coherent European identity (“New Europe” or “Old Europe”), or of any value system taking-hold of public consciousness, defending ‘liberal democracy’ in Ukraine inevitably led to a fallback resort —‘Ukraine’ became the project around which European leaders imagined they could keep Europe’s cohesion somewhat intact.

Maintaining the ‘Ukraine project’ became a life-jacket.

‘Ukraine’ thus was intended to inject purpose and direction — particularly after the 2003 Iraq split when France and Germany declined to support the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The atmospherics were toxic, (as I recall from working as an adviser to Javier Solana, then EU Foreign Policy Chief, between 1997-2023).

Now, however, ‘Ukraine’ has become a problem. Whereas the ‘New Europe–Old Europe’ division that it was supposed to paper-over is no longer so acute, a different schism has replaced it — the current schism lies between Europe’s aloof ruling and oligarchic class, on one side, and on the other, its increasingly desperate citizenry. This new schism constitutes a different order of crisis — for it is existential for the EU.

No European leader/s of stature have any feasible plan how to end the Ukraine entanglement, nor any clear idea how to fund continuing the war without crashing the very financial architecture that underpins ‘liberal’ Europe. This would risk collapsing the EU’s foundational myth guaranteeing citizens a prosperous standard of living.

The dilemma is plain: Supporting Ukraine as a symbol of ‘liberal democracy’ has become paradoxical as liberal modernity itself is collapsing. Europe’s own claim to democracy is itself increasingly questioned — most recently by events in Poland, where EU stalwart PM Donald Tusk insists that EU law trumps Poland’s constitution.

With Washington now insisting that Europe become its proxy for the continuance of the war of attrition against Russia, the dilemma has sharpened into a Hobson’s Choice — the EU can attempt to save its existing financial architecture, or continue to finance Zelensky’s war. But within the EU’s own framework, it cannot do both:

Payments to Zelensky under the €90 billion Ukraine support loan facility for 2026–2027 continue to be disbursed by the EU; however this sum, Zelensky says, has already largely been spent, resulting in the need for another €70 billion ‘urgently’ —

“We need at least 70 billion euros more from you – for defense, for weapons, and for our resilience. This is a realistic amount. And I ask you to find this support”.

Incredibly, the €90 billion EU loan facility did not appear as ‘a line item’ in the present EU budget. There were no €90 billion member-state cheques’ written out to Brussels. What the budget provided was merely a guarantee that if Ukraine failed to repay this loan, the EU would itself honour the debt to bondholders. (A number of EU states nevertheless refused to participate in the EU guarantee and say that they will refuse again, if asked to guarantee another such loan facility).

In addition, the €90 billion never entered the EU budget specified as ‘spending’. The Commission merely says that the loan was made under ‘headroom’ in its budget. (The EU defines this as the difference between the absolute cap that member states have agreed the Commission can call on them to pay, and the seven-year nominal budget appropriations). Until now, the ‘Ukraine’ subvention has been ‘facilitated’ by this ‘smoke and mirrors’ headroom procedure — but this cannot continue.

It cannot continue because any further such subventions must fall under the seven-year EU budget framework, which is now subject to heated debate.

The current budget proposal postulates that simply to maintain existing levels of EU spending requires a lot more money to be contributed by member states for each of the next seven years. The Commission proposes that total annual national contributions rise to €235 billion — an 81% increase at current prices. Even Berlin’s ambassador called this “simply not affordable”.

Without the seven-year EU budget being settled, there cannot be a financial solution to Ukraine’s incremental demands from EU member states.

And the seven-year budget is far from being settled — a fiscally stressed Germany is being told by the Commission to increase its contributions from approximately €40 billion to €60 billion, and an even more fiscally-broken France is being told to increase its contribution over the next seven years from approximately €30 billion to €40 billion per annum. These are dire demands.

Long story short — the EU cannot afford to finance Ukraine without resorting to bloodletting austerity at home exacerbating European-wide social and political breakdown.

Walter Münchau points to a more serious wrinkle:

“I struggle to see how France can end up with a government that succeeds in doing all of the following: (1) bringing the budget deficit under control; (2) avoiding social unrest; (3) complying with European rules; and (4) staying in the eurozone. Something has to give here”.

Marine Le Pen has rejected the notion of any increased contribution by France to the EU budget, should she succeed in becoming French President next year. On the contrary, she has said she would seek to reduce France’s contribution from the proposed level (€30 billion) to €10 billion — and to halt all French contributions to Ukraine.

The end outcome, were she to assume the Presidency, would likely be France’s resort to the ECB to request a bailout which, if refused, could lead to a default on payments to bondholders of French debt.

The situation is critical because, as Münchau suggests,

“France defaulting on its debt would likely lead to a French exit from the euro. Should we ever get to this point, the ensuing financial crisis would dwarf everything we have ever experienced. Financial institutions would fail all over the world. For its part, the eurozone might not survive, as other countries default on their debts and crash out in turn. Ironically, one of the European countries most affected in this scenario would be the UK. Despite not being a member of the EU, let alone the eurozone, Britain’s capital market would be deeply vulnerable to chaos across the Channel”.

(Münchau makes the point that he does not suggest this outcome would be Le Pen’s preferred option)

However, when set against Le Pen’s threat to drastically reduce France’s contribution to the EU budget and to cut Ukraine loose, she doesn’t sound committed to the EU (though she denies wanting to quit the Eurozone).

Nonetheless, were a debt default to become inevitable, France leaving the Eurozone through the door of default might come about by force majeure, rather than deliberate choice. That outcome — though highly consequential for Europe, as Münchau warns — would then allow France to adopt a more competitive exchange rate and to set for itself interest rates more suited to its circumstances.

Brussels has few options: Whether they continue to fund Kiev or not, the war is lost. And a more profound threat lies ahead —

Look at what’s happened since the Ukraine and Iran wars began: Natural gas prices: +206%; Diesel prices: +39%; Petrol prices: +27%; Crude oil prices: +50%; Eurozone inflation: 1.9% → 3.8%.

Winter is truly coming. Everything will change, as Europe’s ruling élites try to pretend nothing has.

* * *

  1. Excuse my lack of enthusiasm. The European foreign policy of which Mr Pacino speaks is not easily separated from domestic policy. On both, it’s not just that a basic prerequisite for recovery would mean ousting the current Atlanticist leaders in London, Paris, Berlin, Warsaw and of course Brussels (a daunting task given their Washington allegiance, as explored here.) Yet to date it’s the nation-firsters – Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and we needn’t love either man to see this – the EC globalists have with Washington’s help ousted. But even with new leaders in Europe, committed to putting the interests of their own citizens and economies first, the scale of the problem, so far unacknowledged – whether through ideological blindness or dishonesty is a moot point – is daunting for two reasons. One is the decline of manufacturing, both exposed and exacerbated by the folly of fighting Russia over Ukraine but going back further: to a half century of dominant finance capital which saw greater profits in offshoring industry – i.e. modern imperialism – while at home capturing government (EU and EC included) to form creditor oligarchies. The other is the surrender of defence to Washington, thereby forfeiting sovereignty. Both things I have discussed, and will continue to discuss, in other posts.
  2. As with the deeply disturbing cases of Switzerland’s Colonel Jacques Baud and Bristol University’s David Miller, Professor Diesen is now hounded by his university employer in Norway. Academia – or in Col. Baud’s case access to a bank account – have decidedly become fronts in the war on truth.

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